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INTRODUCTION 
It is not an unusual nor particularly new claim to acknowledge the intersectional 
oppressions and dominations that stain all aspects of many human societies as having a 
connected necessity to dismantle. Ecofeminist Philosophy is a field in which some of the 
work of theorizing about such processes of dismantling is done, and it is done so 
specifically through the connections between women and the natural world, (although 
indeed does often note the more broadly linked oppressions of minority groups and 
beings). As the arguments and theories even within Ecofeminist Philosophy are many, 
and at times are incompatible, I approach and engage with this large topic with a 
narrowed focus on Karen Warren’s Ecofeminist arguments. 
 I argue that Karen Warren’s interpretation of Ecofeminism is correct in regard to 
the connections between the domination of women and the domination of nature;1 
however, it is wrong insofar as it posits that the reason one must be committed to 
dismantling both dominations is based in the wrong that befalls the victim in these 
relationships. Rather, I argue that Warren’s Ecofeminist objective of committing an 
individual to dismantling the domination of women and the domination of the natural 
world can be improved by appealing to the moral problems inherent in the process of 
dominating. That is, this commitment to dismantle these dominations is derived instead 
from the harms to the perfectionist and prudential value of the dominator. I make this 
argument by first introducing Warren’s argument and the problems within it in Chapters 
                                                          
1 It is important to note the language that I will use throughout this paper. For the purposes of clarity, I will 
utilize Warren’s definition of “nature,” that being “plants and rocks,” and further, will interchangeably use 
“nature,” “the natural world,” “the land,” and “the environment.” I note this to acknowledge the 
complexities and oppressions tied up within these various words; nonetheless, I have chosen to use them 
interchangeably to most clearly align my language with the thinkers that are referenced throughout. 
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1 and 2. In Chapter 3, I make clear the important distinctions between harming and 
wronging, and prudential and perfectionist value. These distinctions, while seemingly 
overlooked by Warren, become crucial for my own argument as it relies upon a clear 
understanding of harm and how it interacts with these two types of value in regard to the 
dominator. With this foundation, I am then able to develop my redirection of Warren’s 
argument. This redirection is structured by the following three chapters, in which I 
discuss living well and liberty (Chapter 4), Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic (Chapter 5), and 
the human-land relationship (Chapter 6). These chapters provide structure to my 
argument by introducing the concept and question of what it is to “live well”, alongside 
the work of a prominent Environmental thinker, Aldo Leopold. Leopold provides an 
alternative framework to consider the human relationship with the natural world, and an 
assessment and deconstruction of the human-land relationship, all elements that work 
together in my own reframing of Warren’s Ecofeminism. Chapter 6 also begins the work 
of embedding these elements within each other, as I point to the harms that impact the 
dominators flourishing in the context of liberty. I complete my argument in Chapter 7, by 
discussing the harms that impact the dominators well-being and flourishing in the context 
of relating to the other, specifically through breeding isolation.  
By focusing on the harms associated with the act of dominating itself, rather than 
the problems within the concept of harm that Warren focuses on, I hope to provide a 
reformulation of an Ecofeminist argument that commits one to dismantling the twin 
dominations of women and nature without relying upon conceptions of wronging as they 
play out for the various victims of domination. I hope too to acknowledge the dominators 
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position, and inherited ideations of privilege, to compel to act those that must, for a 
reason that is more consistent (albeit narcissistic in ways) and uniquely universal. 
CHAPTER 1 
ECOFEMINISM AND WARREN’S ARGUMENT 
 In this chapter I will introduce the concept of “Ecofeminism,” and explore Karen 
Warren’s positioning and argument for the Ecofeminist objective. 
CHAPTER 1.1: AN INTRODUCTION TO KAREN WARREN’S ECOFEMINISM 
“Ecological Feminism” or “Ecofeminism” is a term that is difficult to define. To 
resolve this difficulty, I will utilize Philosopher Karen J. Warren’s definition of 
Ecofeminism as a foundation for considering the topic. I will do so due to her definition’s 
clarity and clear logical development, as well as for its accessibility to a layperson 
attempting to understand connections between the oppression of women and nature. With 
this definition in mind, I will consider Ecofeminist theories regarding relationships, and 
present Warren’s argument regarding the necessity for dismantling the twin dominations 
of women and nature. However, where Warren identifies the commitment to dismantle 
these twin dominations as derived from the wrong that is done to the victim, I will instead 
identify this commitment as derived from the moral problems inherent within the process 
of dominating, namely, the harm to the dominators perfectionist value in the context of 
liberty as well as in the context of relationships.   
Before delving into the specifics of Ecofeminism and structural oppression, it is 
necessary to discuss subalternate positioning. Warren approaches oppression by first 
introducing a vocabulary for unjustifiably dominated groups: “Others,” meaning “both 
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‘human Others’ (such as women, people of color, children, and the poor) and ‘earth 
Others’ (such as animals, forests, the land).”2 This initial linguistic category of “Others” 
introduces the connections between those who are unjustifiably dominated, and, while 
there exists much diversity within this category of Others, allows a movement of 
solidarity “based on shared beliefs and interests.”3 Such a movement illuminates the 
effects of structural oppression on all that are oppressed, and further, illuminates the 
shared necessity for escaping this oppression. This point should not go unregistered, as 
the structural connections between those harmed by oppressive frameworks are crucial to 
recognize if one is to fight to dismantle such negative realities. Nonetheless, Warren’s 
Ecofeminist theory does not focus on each and every group within the category of Others, 
which admittedly may raise some concerns. The choice to focus specifically on women as 
a group within Others is not a claim of a hierarchical importance in deconstructing 
dominated groups beginning with gender, but rather, as Warren posits, the focus on 
women exposes important elements of the intersectionality of domination. That is, in 
approaching domination as an overlapping system of oppression for various social 
identities, it is useful to focus on just a single identity, such as women as women, (rather 
than women as human, women as mothers, women as wives, etc.), within the category of 
Others, to clearly and then comprehensively explore that intersectionality.4  
Within the subgroups present in Others, Warren explores gender by noting, “it is 
often women who suffer disproportionately higher risks and harms than men.”5 She 
                                                          
2 Karen Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on what it is and Why it Matters (Lanham, 
Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 1. 
3 Karen J. Warren, “The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism,” Environmental Ethics 12, (1990): 
125. 
4 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on what it is and Why it Matters, 2. 
5 Ibid., 2. 
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further argues that “female-gender roles…overlap with a particular environmental issue 
in a way that male-gender roles do not,” and finally, that some Western ideologies “that 
underlie the conception and domination of “nature” are male-gender biased in ways that 
are distinct from other sorts of bias.”6 A focus on the domination of women lends itself to 
a particularly effective window into the group of Others and into domination in general, 
and as such justifies Warren and other’s focus on women in understanding oppressive 
frameworks in the context of Ecofeminism. 
CHAPTER 1.2: WARREN’S ARGUMENT 
With an account for the choice of focus on women rather than other Others 
included in the category of the oppressed outlined, one can then turn to the specifics of 
Warren’s Ecofeminist argument. Warren provides a relatively inclusive definition of the 
term “Ecofeminism”: “the position that there are important connections—historical, 
experiential, symbolic, theoretical—between the domination of women and the 
domination of nature, an understanding of which is crucial to both feminism and 
environmental ethics.”7 This definition highlights the culturally purported link between 
women and nature, the association with women and the natural, the mother and mother 
earth, and the emotional and natural women: all dual to the dispassionate and civil man. 
In this definition, Warren establishes a footing for an interpretation of relationships, 
specifically for those that are dominance based. With the connections between the 
dominations of women and nature recognized, Warren then goes on to claim that insofar 
as these are twin dominations informed by the same oppressive frameworks, to challenge 
one is to commit to challenging both.   
                                                          
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Warren, ““The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism,” 123. 
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Warren establishes the point of these dominations as tied by focusing on the 
“logic of domination” that is at work in both the oppression of nature and the oppression 
of women. Without the logic of domination, “a description of similarities and differences 
would be just that—a description of similarities and differences;”8 that is, the logic of 
domination ensures the impossibility for difference without hierarchy. A logic of 
domination employs value-hierarchical frameworks to dictate moral superiority, (or, 
those beings that have superior moral value), and works as the moral premise that asserts 
superiority as justifying subordination. Namely, the existence of a logic of domination 
means that there is a logically coherent structure that can be used to justify subordination 
by laying out and appealing to levels of social, physical, etc. superiority and subsequent 
inferiority that permits domination. In the oppression of both women and the 
environment, the logic of domination is applied in the same manner, and as such the 
dominations are twin, linking the two in such a way that Ecofeminists argue to dismantle 
one domination commits one to dismantling the other. Warren’s interpretation of this 
working follows as such: from the assumed premise that “whatever has the capacity to 
consciously and radically change the community in which it lives is morally superior to 
whatever lacks this capacity,” (a premise predicated on value-hierarchical thinking), it 
follows that humans are superior to plants and rocks. Following this with an introduction 
of the logic of domination, “For any X and Y, if X is morally superior to Y, then X is 
morally justified in subordinating Y,” the argument concludes with the claim that 
“humans are morally justified in subordinating plants and rocks.”9 With the oppressive 
framework of the human and nature relationship established, it then follows that 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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recognizing the cultural link between women and nature reiterates the domination of 
women in the same format: “whatever is identified with nature and the realm of the 
physical is inferior to (“below”) whatever is identified with the “human” and the realm of 
the mental,”10 again a value-hierarchical thought. Employing the logic of domination 
again, “For any X and Y, if X is superior to Y, then X is justified in subordinating Y,” it 
follows then that men, of the human and mental realm, are justified in subordinating 
women, of the natural and the physical realm. It is this conceptual framework that has 
functioned and continues to function to oppress women and nature in the same manner; 
thus it is impossible to address just one of these dominations when both are derived from 
and dependent upon the same patriarchal structure.  
 
 
  
                                                          
10 Ibid., 124. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 WARREN’S MISTAKE 
Here I will begin to push back against Warren, and identify where I believe her argument 
is vulnerable to neglected important distinctions and claims. 
CHAPTER 2.1: WARREN’S MISTAKE 
Karen Warren’s Ecofeminist argument operates on the premises of value-
hierarchies and the logic of domination as consistent and parallel across both the 
oppression of women as well as the natural world, a conceptual consistency and 
connection that requires one to attend to both dominations. That is, if one agrees that the 
premises that posit humans as superior to nature and men as superior to women are 
incorrect, and further, resists superiority as justifying subordination, then the commitment 
to dismantling both dominations as a dual requirement remains. However, if one does not 
deny these premises, then Warren’s argument fails. Warren is vulnerable to a 
counterargument that asks what particular kind of “thing” is on either side of the 
dominant relationship and whether that “thing” is one such that may be permissibly 
dominated. If domination is problematic for the impact that it has on the victim, in other 
words for the wronging of the dominated, then one must assume that nature can be 
wronged in order to accept Warren’s argument. But, is this a reasonable concession to 
make, or is it possible that nature is not the type of “thing” that can be wronged? If 
nature, “plants and rocks” as Warren defines it, is not the particular kind of thing that can 
be wronged, then there is reason to grant the permissibility of its domination. In order to 
make a claim either way further consideration into the capacity for nature to be wronged 
is required. Such consideration can be approached through the deliberation of notions of 
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nature’s utility, or instrumental value, and nature’s rationality, sentience, and teleological 
functioning, or nature’s ability to be wronged. 
CHAPTER 2.2: INSTRUMENTAL VALUE 
 Challenging these premises of value and superiority in the context of utility, 
rationality, sentience, and teleological functioning raises important questions that make 
distinct women from nature. Before delving into the notion of wronging, I will consider 
these distinctions between women and nature, turning first to the instrumental value of 
the natural world. It seems possible that there are instances wherein some domination of 
nature is required, though the same cannot be said about any domination of women. For 
example, there is the issue of food. The human population is dependent upon nutrients 
garnered from plants and animals for survival, and our food system processes embody 
domination of the natural world. One might respond to this by arguing that as a part of 
nature ourselves, the human population can partake in the circle of life and death and 
consumption of the land not solely as domination but as necessity of community. This 
response might then point to the food industry’s approach as frivolous domination, and 
take issue in that framing. This is not a difficult point to concede: in 2015, the United 
States slaughtered 5.2 million cows for the commercial food industry, not only an 
extreme example of humanity’s violent and widespread domination over animals, but 
also a comment on the lengths gone to for food production. While perhaps consumption 
of cows is not an essential element of human life, the same scale of domination appears 
over all varieties of food items and agricultural exploitation that exist in the human food 
industry, manifesting as genetic modification and erosion, soil erosion and degradation, 
wasteful water consumption, and countless other oppressions inflicted on the natural 
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world as a consequence of its instrumentality. Thus, there is indeed a distinction to be 
drawn between frivolous domination (albeit necessary) and sustainable necessary 
domination. Food aside, one may also consider shelter; the shelters humans create are 
possible only through the subjugation of the trees cut, the rocks fragmented, and the holes 
dug, instrumental to human living insofar as shelter is necessary, but excessive in 
application. These above two examples are only the baseline of what could be regarded 
as necessary domination based on instrumental value, without yet even mentioning 
arguments for the economic utility of nature, and seem to posit the permissibility of 
sometimes dominating nature in some ways, whether one makes claims against 
frivolousness or not. Regardless of the extent of and/or approach to domination, all of 
these “necessary dominations” seem untranslatable to woman. 
CHAPTER 2.3: RATIONALITY, SENTIENCE, TELEOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING 
Turning away from the “necessity” argument, one may begin to the address the 
question of wronging, and therein the potential justification behind the domination of 
nature: the difference between the rational, sentient, and teleological organization of 
woman and the argued absence of rationality, sentience, and teleological organization of 
nature. It is here where I argue that Warren’s depiction of Ecofeminism fails. If the 
indictment of domination in the context of the human is dependent upon wronging due to 
the humanity’s rational and sentient nature, or due to their perfectionist value, then if 
nature, (again plants and rocks), has none of these qualities, it seems less troublesome, if 
at all, as a subject of domination. If a geologist smashes a rock with a rock hammer, but 
the rock cannot feel or even perceive the hammer’s blow, it seems acceptable to say that 
the geologist is not wronging the rock. Further, if there is not an intrinsic aim or end that 
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exists within all rocks, a “teleological function,” then there is no perfectionist value to be 
affected as the geologist smashes the rock. The rock is neither sentient nor rational, and 
similarly, it is difficult to argue for either of these qualities as existing in plants. Thus, 
this formulation of nature posits it as a permissible particular kind of “thing” to dominate.  
Of course, if one begins to expand the boundaries of Warren’s definition of nature 
to include animals, a logical development considering the general western cultural 
interpretation of nature includes wild animals (and one that I will at least address briefly 
to acknowledge this common understanding), the point of at least sentience begins to 
change. Animals are creatures that have the capacity for experience, and, more pertinent 
to a conversation about domination, are creatures that suffer and feel pain—thus, they are 
sentient. This is a relatively moderate point to concede with contemporary biological and 
neurological research, however, if the traces of uncertainty that inflict this field of 
research (stemming from the difficulty of language and communication barriers) remain 
of concern, it can at least be said that, for example, dogs suffer and cry when they are 
kicked. If one accepts the sentience, or at least a semblance of sentience, of non-human 
animals, the justification of domination must then land on the matter of rationality. 
Animal cognition is a point that has been disputed by early western philosophers such as 
Aristotle, who rejected the possibility of rationality existing in animals other than 
humans, and Kant, who focused on the incapacity for animals to think about themselves 
and thus lacked rational agency,11 as well as later thinkers and scientists who have 
conversely argued for elements of the human mind that seem to appear in animals as 
well. Ultimately, due to the methodological issues regarding the study of animal minds 
                                                          
11 Andrews, Kristin, "Animal Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
Summer 2016 Edition, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/cognition-animal/. 
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and the controversy and lack of clarity that exists, I will concede that the potential for 
animals’ irrationality lends itself to a justification for subordination. 
CHAPTER 2.4: BREAKING DOWN WARREN’S ARGUMENT 
These arguments that separate the domination of nature from the domination of 
women for reasons of necessity as well as logical justification are important to consider, 
as on them rests Warren’s point of the commitment to dismantle both dominations. 
Warren argues that one cannot recognize the structural oppression of women and 
structural oppression of nature, the value-hierarchy and logic of domination acting the 
same in both, and only choose to confront one of the dominations and still claim 
consistency. However, the lens of harm to the victim that Warren utilizes in this argument 
is not one that stands, as sentience, or at least rationality, is a major distinction between 
women and nature that affects their statuses as subjects of harm. Warren might respond to 
this question of rationality by pointing to the western cultural dualistic association of men 
with the rational and women with the irrational. As long as this duality between women 
and men, with men associated with rationale and organization and women associated 
with “the emotional” and disorder, is validated in our culture, so too is the association of 
women with nature and men with civilization validated.12 This is not to say that this 
western dualism is correct nor that the Ecofeminist need adhere to it in order to believe in 
non-domination; however, as ecofeminism is dependent upon the social and cultural 
structures and rhetoric that have been and continue to be propagated, this social ordering 
of men as rational and women as not cannot go unnoted and without influence on 
advocating against the oppressions of nature and women. A feminist and an 
                                                          
12 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on what it is and Why it Matters: 47. 
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environmentalist must work under the constraints of cultural narratives, despite the likely 
opposition to those narratives; each is committed to dismantling the oppressive 
framework that utilizes language to deem value based on rationality, regardless of the 
truth in that language and narrative. 
This point of the restrictive cultural narrative within which the dismantling of 
oppression must occur is valid insofar as this duality between men and women exists and 
does affect the treatment of women. However, the acknowledgement that this western 
dualism is incorrect suggests that in a space within which one is aiming to dismantle an 
oppression, this dualism can be rejected in the process of advocating for women. That is, 
an individual could simply argue for the rationality or teleological organization of women 
and then from there, aim to dismantle the domination of women, without having to even 
acknowledge the oppression of the environment. It is much easier as well as less 
problematic to make arguments for these qualities that exist within women and oppose 
this duality, than it is to work within it and argue for non-domination of women despite 
implicated constructions of the irrationality of women. As such, these distinctions 
between women and nature seems significant enough to harm Warren’s thesis as again it 
affects the status of women and nature as twin subjects of harm. The rational, sentient, 
and teleologically organized woman can be wronged, however the non-sentient, non-
rational, and non-teleologically organized rock may not have this same capacity; the 
Ecofeminist argument cannot then commit one to advocating for women and nature on 
the premise of wronging. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN HARMING VS. WRONGING AND PRUDENTIAL 
VS. PERFECTIONIST VALUE 
In this chapter I will aim to make important distinctions that seem to have been neglected 
by Warren, and will set up latter parts of my argument. 
CHAPTER 3.1: MAKING DISTINCTIONS 
Before continuing into my own arguments regarding Ecofeminism, there is a 
distinction to be made here between understandings of harm and wronging, especially in 
the context of concepts of well-being versus concepts of flourishing. That is, as in my 
following discussion the question of harm and wronging to women as well as to the 
environment will arise, it is important to first discuss the exact formulations of harm and 
wronging that will apply. In this argument, I will be considering these concepts as they 
play out for the dominator in regard to flourishing as well as well-being/welfare. Moral 
Philosopher Leonard Wayne Sumner articulates the distinction between the two concepts 
of well-being and flourishing as “prudential value” versus “perfectionist value” 
respectively, the former referring to a value founded in the welfare of a person dependent 
upon how they13 are “faring” and whether they are “doing well”14, while the latter 
addresses the value of the person’s life relative to the nature of their being and in that, the 
function of their species identity. Sumner further examines this distinction by noting that 
                                                          
13 Here I acknowledge the grammatical mistake of utilizing “they” in a singular context, however also note 
that I will continue to do so in referring to individuals to recognize the complex reality of gender fluidity 
and gender politics. 
14 Leonard Wayne Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1996): 1. 
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welfare “is a matter of how well a life is going,”15 while perfectionist value refers to 
whether a “thing” is a “good instance or specimen of its kind” or “exemplifies the 
excellences characteristic of its particular nature.”16 Thus, prudential value refers to the 
well-being of the individual, an achievement of good not founded in the expectation of 
species identity as perfectionist value references, but rather in that which “yield[s] truth 
conditions for claims about, or assessments of, our interest or well-being.”17  Sumner 
continues to explicate this concept by offering the following useful example:  
You can easily imagine yourself, at the end of your life, taking pride in your high 
level of self-development but nonetheless wishing that you had got more out of 
your life, that it had been more rewarding or fulfilling, and thinking that it might 
have gone better for you had you devoted less energy to perfecting your talents 
and more to just hanging out or diversifying your interests. Whatever we are to 
count as excellences for creatures of our nature, they will raise the perfectionist 
value of our lives regardless of the extent of their payoff for us. There is therefore 
no logical guarantee that the best human specimens will also be the best off, or 
that their underdeveloped rivals will not be faring better...the perfectionist value 
of a life is conceptually independent of how well it is going for the owner.18 
In this example, Sumner calls attention to the important difference between success as 
dictated by ones species identity and the subjective success in one’s personal well-being. 
While one may have significant perfectionist value, this does not necessarily have 
anything to do with how that being’s life is going for him/her/them. Thus, Sumner 
                                                          
15 Ibid, 8. 
16 Ibid, 24 
17 Ibid, 7. 
18 Ibid, 24. 
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presents the concept of living well as conceptually separate from excellence of being, and 
therein as a product of factors beyond just teleological function.  
It is important to note here the potential assumption that theories of well-being are 
based entirely in the subjective experience of the individual. While Sumner claims that 
any attempts at objective theories of welfare fail due to “descriptive inadequacy,”19 this is 
not to say that these objective theories do not exist. Rather, there do indeed exist theories 
of objective prudential value. This is just to say that the defining and most poignant 
element of prudential value that distinguishes it from perfectionist value is not a reliance 
on subjectivity, but rather the notion that prudential value is the condition of faring well, 
with or without reference to subjectivity.  
As has been determined, the perfectionist value is distinguishable from the 
prudential value and thus welfare of a being; from this, it then follows that it is possible 
for a being to be harmed in the sense of the perfectionist value without being harmed in 
the sense of prudential value. That is, the excellence of the being can be undermined by a 
harm that is not contrary to the interests of the being. One such example, employing 
Sumner’s theory of subjective prudential value, could be formulated as the following: 
consider a human being who lives isolated from his local community. He not only lives in 
isolation, but also takes no measures to reach out to the community, and as such has no 
friends, or even acquaintances. However, this individual is tempered such that he is not 
bothered by this isolation, rather, he quite prefers to be alone. As far as he is concerned, 
his life is indeed going well. In this situation, this individual is not being harmed 
prudentially, for as noted, it is within his subjective interests to be without 
                                                          
19 Ibid, 46. 
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companionship so actually his prudential value and well-being is increased in this 
scenario. However, simultaneously, given that he is a human being and thus of a 
gregarious species that engages in social interaction and social communities, his isolation 
means that he thus does not “display the excellences appropriate to [human] kind.”20 
Here, the individual’s perfection of species is at risk, and his ability to flourish is harmed. 
In this way, a harm that becomes an individual’s perfectionist values can simultaneously 
be identified as not such, or even a good, for the individuals prudential values. 
Sumner’s distinction implicitly calls attention to another question of clarification 
and distinction to be made, that of harm versus wronging; while both are relevant to some 
degree, harm will be more pertinent to my particular argument. In my use of the term 
“harm” I specifically refer to that which affects a decrease in either perfectionist or 
prudential value. With this use of “harm” it is not always clear that it is distinguishable 
from a simultaneous wronging. Nonetheless, there are contexts in which harming and 
wronging occur simultaneously, as well as contexts where one may occur and the other 
may not. That is, it is conceptually possible to be harmed without being wronged, as well 
as possible to be wronged without being harmed. As I’ve outlined, while harm denotes a 
decrease in either prudential or perfectionist value generally, wronging has a more 
nuanced application in its more evaluative focus on rights.  An example of the former 
situation could look like this: Person A buys the last donut at the donut shop, a donut that 
Person B had been planning on buying themself. Person A bought the donut first simply 
because Person A was in front of Person B in line; thus, Person A followed social 
regulations and norms and justly got to the last donut first. This means that Person A did 
                                                          
20 Ibid, 78. 
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not wrong Person B as he had the right to buy the donut himself. However, while Person 
A may not have wronged Person B, they did harm Person B. As Person B was planning 
on having that donut, Person A harmed Person B by interfering with Person B’s desire 
and plan to have that donut. In this same vein, there exist examples wherein a person may 
be wronged but not harmed. Consider that Person B did not go to the donut shop, and 
instead Person A went and bought the last donut and then broke into Person B’s 
apartment to leave the donut as a gift for Person B. In this example, Person B was not 
harmed, as they actually benefited from Person A’s action in regards to gaining a donut. 
However, by breaking into Person B’s apartment, Person A did wrong Person B, for to 
gain entrance to Person B’s private property without consent violates a right of Person B 
that constitutes wronging. 
This distinction between harming versus wronging is necessary for elucidation in 
a discussion of Ecofeminism and distinguishing between victims of domination because 
while harm to prudential value can indeed constitute wronging, it is not clear that a harm 
to perfectionist value can constitute a wronging. It is possible to imagine a harm to 
prudential value that also implies a wronging in the following example: If Tommy keys 
Kate’s car, Tommy has both harmed Kate by damaging her property, as well as wronged 
Kate by interfering with her property when she has the right for Tommy not to do so. 
Thus, there do exist instances in which an individual’s prudential value is harmed 
simultaneously as they are wronged. It is not necessary to continue on to ask whether a 
non-conscious being can be wronged prudentially as I have already established that non-
conscious beings are not bearers of prudential value. 
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It is clear that in a case where a woman is dominated that she is wronged in the 
sense of her perfectionist value because her flourishing is dictated by her identity as a 
human, rather than a gender identity, and thus her flourishing requires equal opportunity 
and freedom as any other human being. Domination impedes human flourishing because 
it introduces an obstacle to excellence in the social, political, economic, etc. spheres. 
However, it is also possible for a situation to occur where an individual’s perfectionist 
value is harmed but they are not wronged, as the moral consequences differ dependent 
upon context. That is, as I have noted, perfectionist value is one such value that extends 
beyond humans to organisms in the natural world, unlike many theories of prudential 
value. For example, trees have perfectionist value, and this value can be harmed insofar 
as the flourishing of a tree can be interrupted by carving words into its trunk. Yet, for 
someone to carve words into the trunk does not necessarily mean that they are wronging 
the tree, even though they may be harming it. Working with Sumner’s particular 
formulation of prudential value, this also does not mean the tree is being harmed 
prudentially, as the tree is not a bearer of prudential value. Interestingly, in this context, 
the perfectionist value of the tree seems to be worth a different type of consideration than 
does the prudential value or welfare of a being. In examples of beings that have 
prudential value, for example Kate in the above example, it seems that prudential value 
falls in the moral realm such that it is worth promoting, for faring well seems different 
from flourishing. Kate is a being that has the distinct capacity to fare well, and have 
interests, and as such, has the capacity for this value to be wronged. The tree having 
perfectionist value does not necessarily seem to warrant the same attendance to or 
promotion of value, as it is referential to an excellence of being rather than a more 
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individualized welfare. In this way, it seems that harming and wronging may come 
together or apart in different contexts, especially when compared across prudential versus 
perfectionist value. 
CHAPTER 3.2: RELATING THE DISTINCTIONS TO MY ARGUMENT 
These distinctions, first between prudential value and perfectionist value, and then 
from that a more fine-tuned and relevant conception of harm and wronging, are important 
for the arguments that will follow for my reference to and the significance of prudential 
value versus perfectionist value in the context of the victim of domination. In my 
consideration of the Ecofeminist plight, and the effects of domination on the dominators 
as well as the dominated, I will reference not prudential value nor harm to such, but 
rather I will focus on perfectionist value and the conception of flourishing, for while 
harm to prudential value applies to women it is more difficult to argue its application to 
the natural world. In my arguments connecting the domination of nature with the 
domination of women and the importance of as well as commitment to dismantling both, 
perfectionist value will be most relevant for its attempt to utilize the objective and 
intrinsically valuable being. That is, in considering the individuals, I will not have to 
attempt to make claims regarding their subjective preferences, but rather I can approach 
the individuals considered through associated species identity and expectation. Finally, 
the parallel that will be drawn between women and the natural world will be founded in 
the harm that befalls the dominator’s perfectionist value. To further clarify these points, I 
have provided the following chart considering Ecofeminism and Domination: 
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Can 
Domination 
Harm… 
 
Prudential Value  
  
Perfectionist Value 
Harm Wrong Harm Wrong 
Women Yes 
Reason: Domination 
is against the 
woman’s interest and 
thus hinders her well-
being 
Ex./ A woman who is 
dominated by a man 
who treats her as 
property is harmed in 
that she is treated 
without respect and 
human decency, and 
cannot engage in free 
action. 
  
Yes 
Reason: Domination 
is against the 
woman’s interest and 
interferes with her 
right to external 
freedom. 
Ex./A woman who is 
dominated by a man 
who treats her as 
property is wronged 
insofar as her 
freedom is 
suppressed and 
rational action and 
humanity denied by 
the man in control. 
  
  
Yes 
Reason: Domination 
decreases the 
woman’s ability to 
flourish as a human 
being 
Ex./ A woman who 
is dominated by a 
man that considers 
her property cannot 
herself have true 
agency and freedom 
to pursue functional 
human pursuits 
involving free 
rational action, 
such as free pursuit 
of livelihood, 
education, etc. 
Yes 
Reason: 
Domination 
interferes with the 
woman’s ability to 
flourish and right 
to flourish as free 
human being in 
social, political, 
economic, etc. 
spheres. 
Ex./A woman who 
is dominated by a 
man who treats 
her as property 
may participate in 
human practices in 
a way that aligns 
with her 
perfectionist value, 
such as engaging 
in free social 
practices, if the 
man is in control. 
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Natural 
World 
No 
Reason: It is not 
evident that the 
natural world has the 
rational 
consciousness to have 
interests and thus can 
be harmed 
prudentially 
Ex./A jungle system is 
not harmed when a 
tree is cut down. 
  
  
  
  
  
No 
Reason: It is not 
evident that the 
natural world has the 
rational capacity to 
have interests and 
further to be a 
conscious bearer of 
rights so that 
wronging may occur, 
thus it cannot be 
wronged prudentially 
Ex./A jungle system 
is not wronged if a 
tree is cut down 
within it because it 
does not have the 
rational capacity to 
pursue its own 
interests, nor does it 
have the rational 
capacity to be 
wronged in regards 
to its interests. 
  
  
  
  
No 
Reason: An 
Ecosystem is not 
teleologically 
organized in the 
same way that 
individual 
organisms are, thus 
it is not possible to 
speak about an 
Ecosystem’s 
perfectionist value. 
Ex./A desert 
ecosystem has no 
clearer a state of 
flourishing than 
does a random 
assortment of 
animals and plants. 
The individual cacti 
or horned lizards 
may have states of 
excellence, just as 
the individual 
animals and plants 
in the random 
assortment have, 
however the unity of 
the desert 
organisms does not 
have the potential 
for a more excellent 
unity than that of 
the random 
assortment of 
organisms; thus, 
neither have clear 
states of flourishing. 
No 
Reason: An 
Ecosystem cannot 
be wronged in the 
sense of 
perfectionist value 
because it is not 
teleologically 
organized in the 
same way that 
individual 
organisms are, 
thus it is not 
possible to speak 
about an 
Ecosystem’s 
perfectionist value. 
Ex./A desert 
ecosystem has no 
clearer a state of 
flourishing than 
does a random 
assortment of 
animals and 
plants. The 
individual cacti or 
horned lizards 
may have states of 
excellence, just as 
the individual 
animals and plants 
in the random 
assortment have, 
however the unity 
of the desert 
organisms does 
not have the 
potential for a 
more excellent 
unity than that of 
the random 
assortment of 
organisms; thus, 
neither have clear 
states of 
flourishing. 
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Dominator Sometimes 
Reason: Domination 
may increase the 
well-being of the 
dominator, however it 
is equally possible 
that dominating 
harms the ability of 
the dominator to fare 
well. 
Ex./A man who 
dominates women 
may be harmed 
prudentially because 
domination may 
inhibit the well-being 
of the oppressor 
insofar as he 
inherently disengages 
himself socially from 
others. 
Ex./A tiger that 
dominates its prey 
does not have the 
rational capacity for 
subjective interest, 
nonetheless it is 
possible to assume 
that the tiger only 
benefits from this 
domination in terms 
of well-being. 
 
No 
Reason: The 
Dominator is not 
wronged by 
domination in a 
prudential sense 
because the 
domination itself 
does not interfere 
with the dominators 
rights and desires. 
Ex./A man who 
dominates women is 
not wronged 
prudentially because 
his own individual 
external freedom is 
intact. 
Sometimes 
Reason: Both 
rational as well as 
non-rational 
dominators have the 
ability for 
perfection of 
species, however, as 
domination creates 
a path of isolation 
for the dominator 
that may only be 
perceptible to 
rational/sentient 
beings, only such 
beings may be 
harmed from 
dominating others 
Ex./ A man who 
dominates women 
may be harmed in 
the sense of his 
perfectionist value 
because of the 
inherently isolating 
effects of dominant 
positioning, (unable 
to relate to the other 
and form true 
connections as 
normal for 
gregarious species).  
Ex./A tiger that 
dominates its prey is 
not harmed because 
there is no 
rational/sentient 
connection that 
would otherwise be 
possible between 
tiger and prey. 
No 
Reason: The 
Dominator is not 
wronged in a 
perfectionist sense 
by dominating 
other beings 
because the 
domination does 
not affect their 
own ability to 
flourish as a 
human being. 
Ex./A man who 
dominates women 
is not wronged in 
a perfectionist 
sense because his 
external freedom 
to flourish is still 
intact 
  
 28 
 
  
Dominated 
Sometimes 
Reason: Domination 
inhibits the well-
being of rational 
beings insofar as it 
does not align with 
the interests of the 
victims. Non-rational 
beings cannot express 
subjective interests, 
and thus it does not 
make sense to speak 
of prudential value 
Ex./A women that is 
dominated by a man 
by being treated as 
property suffers harm 
to her prudential 
value insofar as she is 
not free to follow 
subjective pursuits. 
  
Sometimes 
Reason: Domination 
interferes with the 
ability for a 
dominated rational 
being to set and 
pursue their own 
subjective ends 
Ex./ A woman who is 
dominated by a man 
who treats her as 
property may not 
establish and pursue 
her own ends, such 
as buying her own 
property, and thus is 
wronged by the man 
in control. 
Ex./A tiger is not 
wronged in a 
prudential sense if 
it’s habitat is 
destroyed because it 
neither has the 
rational capacity to 
have interests nor 
the rational capacity 
to pursue its own 
interest. 
  
  
Sometimes 
Reason: Domination 
inherently 
suppresses the 
perfectionist value 
of any individual 
being as it 
suppresses the 
flourishing of the 
individual 
Ex./A women cannot 
flourish if she is 
dominated by a man 
who treats her as 
property. Nor can a 
tiger flourish if its 
habitat is destroyed 
and dominated by a 
human. 
Sometimes 
Reason: 
Domination 
interferes with the 
ability for a 
dominated rational 
being to set and 
pursue their own 
ends in a way that 
is beneficial for 
their flourishing 
Ex/. A woman who 
is dominated by a 
man who treats 
her as property 
may not live freely 
in a way that 
aligns with her 
perfectionist value, 
barred from such 
perfectionist 
activities such as 
engaging in social 
practices, if the 
man is in control. 
Ex./A tiger is not 
wronged if its 
habitat is 
destroyed because 
it does not have 
the rational 
capacity for 
external freedom 
and right to 
flourish. 
Figure 1. The harm and wronging done by Domination on the prudential and 
perfectionist values of various beings and positioning’s of beings. 
As explored in Figure 1, there exists potential obstacles for focusing an 
Ecofeminist argument on using prudential value over perfectionist value, namely when 
the discussion turns to consideration of the natural world. That is, prudential value is 
either inherently subjective and as such relies upon conscious interest of the subject in 
question, or it relies upon judgements about faring well objectively, so when it comes to 
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assessing the good of the natural world it is less applicable, for determining the interests 
or states of faring well of a non-rational non-sentient being is irrational and ambiguous. 
As Sumner argues, by placing a focus on prudential value, the welfare of the being, it is 
difficult to avoid necessitating an identification of subjective interests of beings and not 
conflate prudential value and perfectionist value by doing so. Sumner discusses this 
difficulty by highlighting a point that Environmental Ethicist Paul W. Taylor brings up, 
in which he considers whether “it makes sense to speak of what is good or bad for the 
thing in question. If we can say, truly or falsely, that something is good for an entity or 
bad for it, without reference to any other entity, then the entity has a good of its own.”21 
Taylor then goes on to conclude that for these beings, “things that happen to them can be 
judged, from their standpoint, to be favorable or unfavorable to them. Yet they are not 
beings that consciously aim at ends or take means to achieve such ends. They do not have 
interests because they are not interested in, do not care about, what happens to them.”22 In 
this explication, Taylor hits upon the exact difficulty in considering harm to the natural 
world: with non-rational beings, one cannot get at the specific subjective interests of the 
individual being, and as such, these beings cannot be bearers of prudential value. Any 
attempt to do so would fall back onto teleological functioning, which Sumner points out 
as problematic for it is “a fallacy to slip from saying that something can be good or bad of 
its kind to saying that it therefore has a welfare.”23 However, while this conclusion posits 
that non-rational beings do not have prudential value and thus cannot be harmed 
prudentially, this is not to say that their perfectionist value is not at risk of being harmed.  
                                                          
21 Ibid, 73. 
22 Ibid, 74. 
23 Ibid, 79. 
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Turning to the objective functioning and perfection of the individual, one can 
indeed make claims of harm to such a process of flourishing. While the limits of harm to 
prudential value of different species become blurry, perfectionist value is at risk of being 
harmed by domination across the categories of women and individual organisms within 
the natural world. It is important to flag here the distinction between the perfectionist 
value of individual organisms and the perfectionist value of the natural world. While the 
former is logically acceptable, as it posits that every organism has a state of excellence of 
functioning, the latter, regarding the perfectionist value of the natural world, seems to 
more difficult to accept as it suggests that there is a state of excellence and flourishing 
that can be identified for the whole combination of the elements of the natural world, that 
is, the unified ecosystem. This latter claim, as noted in Figure 1, is a difficult one to make 
for the apparent arbitrariness of delineating an “excellence of functioning” for a unity of 
organisms. That is, it is not clear what flourishing would look like for a jungle ecosystem 
as there seem to have been a variety of states of jungles throughout different epochs and 
with different organisms that could be deemed “flourishing.” In this same vein, it seems 
inconsistent to claim that one group of organisms living together have a perfectionist 
function, while another assortment of organisms put to live together, do not. There seems 
to be no reason to think that a jungle ecosystem should be a bearer of perfectionist value 
but a meadow in which we place a goat, a rat, a bird, and a yak, should not be a bearer of 
perfectionist value, for both situations are ultimately random assortments of organisms 
living in the same place. Yet we would not deem the meadow situation one such unity 
that should have perfectionist value, so it should follow that neither should we deem a 
jungle system a unity that should have perfectionist value. One may respond to this by 
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arguing rather that the jungle ecosystem is a very different sort of thing than the 
menagerie of animals, handpicked by humans. However, even so, this eclectic system 
evolved through various stages and with various components, none of which were more 
valuable than the last. Simply put, the jungle system has not evolved throughout its 
various stages to have a specific function nor state of flourishing. Thus, the focus on 
perfectionist value of the victims of domination in an Ecofeminist argument becomes 
almost or equally as difficult to pursue as claims against harm to prudential value of 
victims of domination. 
Nonetheless, there still exists a category that remains viable as a path to draw a 
parallel between the domination of women and the natural world, committing one to 
dismantling both. While the category of dominator remains one in which the being may 
only sometimes be harmed in terms of prudential and perfectionist value due to the 
potential necessity for rationale in theories of prudential value, for the purposes of my 
argument this remains acceptable insofar as I focus on humans in the position of 
dominator in both the domination of women as well as the domination of the natural 
world. In this way, it is possible to make an Ecofeminist claim without necessitating 
arguments that get into murky and controversial waters such as the subjectivity of 
prudential value, the rationality of the natural world, and the unity of the natural world. 
A final note in regard to so deliberately distinguishing prudential value and 
perfectionist value is to reiterate and make clear the significance of these different values 
as they apply to the woman and the natural world, and make clear where these subjects of 
domination differ. By recognizing both types of value, the way in which domination 
harms women can be emphasized and validated as distinguishable from the way in which 
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domination harms the natural world, with prudential and perfectionist value informing the 
former, and perfectionist value alone informing the latter. Nonetheless, as my version of 
Warren’s Ecofeminist argument will focus on the harm that befalls the dominator, with 
the assumption that the dominator is human, the implications of both types of value, 
perfectionist and prudential, will be relevant.  
Due to the complication that a focus on wrong to the victim creates in Warren’s 
argument, I have chosen to consider the harm to the dominator in situations of 
domination as an alternative approach to the twin dominations of women and nature that 
can still commit one to dismantling both. Rather than positing the wronging to the subject 
as indictment of the domination of women and nature, a position difficult to defend, I 
argue that it is the harmful formulation of a relationship of domination itself that is 
problematic, as living within relationships of domination is not an ideal way to live, for 
neither an agent nor a subject of the domination can live well, as well as it negatively 
affects the way the agent relates to the subject and vice versa. Most notably of course for 
my argument is the impact to the dominator, for it is from this impact that may derive the 
action to dismantle these dominations, as these structures of oppression must be 
dismantled in order to reduce the obstacles for living a good life. This claim raises two 
questions: How, if at all, does domination ultimately obstruct the process of living well 
thus necessitating its dismantling? The second is a consideration of exactly how 
structures of oppression affect the process and conception of relating to the other. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LIVING WELL AND LIBERTY  
This chapter introduces the concept of “Living Well” and the elements within which that 
will be most relevant for my argument.  
CHAPTER 4.1: INTRODUCING LIBERTY  
To answer the first question one must assess what it is to live “well” and flourish 
in the sense of one’s species identity perfectionist value. In order to address the concept 
of living well, I will utilize theories of Republicanism and Republican liberty, focusing 
specifically on the notion of liberty as requiring the absence of structures of domination. 
While there are a multitude of theories addressing living well and “the good life,” by 
focusing singularly on liberty I hope to address one basic and hopefully less controversial 
component of human good. The Republican idea of freedom aligns well with the 
Ecofeminist agenda of dismantling structures of domination, as it posits that “A person is 
free to the extent that other do not stand over him or her, able to interfere at will and with 
relative impunity in his or her affairs.”24 In order to obtain this liberty the subject needs 
independence from the arbitrary power of the master, which cannot be done by “making 
[the] master a better person” but rather must be done by “render[ing] him less of a 
master…This can only be done by curbing either his arbitrary power, or his subjects’ 
dependency on him.”25 The concept of arbitrary power is one that I will address and 
define further after providing an initial introduction to the good of Republican liberty; 
nonetheless, the basic concept of freedom from domination is thus far clear. 
                                                          
24 Philip Pettit, “The Domination Complaint,” Nomos 46, (2005): 87.  
25 Lovett, Frank,  "Republicanism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
Spring 2017 Edition, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/republicanism/. 
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CHAPTER 4.2: NON-DOMINATION AND LIBERTY AS A GOOD 
Before delving further into specific structures of the Republicanism argument, it 
is important to consider non-domination itself as being a human good (as well as a 
general good), and thus distinguishing itself as a core aspect of liberation. Political 
Philosopher Frank Lovett addresses this concern by distinguishing between the evident 
truth of the goodness of non-domination versus the causal reality of the goodness of non-
domination. That is, “the fact that most people prefer non-domination might be taken as 
evidence that non-domination is a good, but it is not…what makes it good;”26 one cannot 
base the rationale for dismantling domination on preference for the very fact that 
preferences are not universally uniform, and further “as [the] preference weakens or 
disappears, [the] obligation [of reducing domination] diminishes correspondingly.”27 
Thus, the wrong of domination must come from somewhere else, originating instead, as 
Lovett argues, in its nature as an obstacle to human flourishing for “enjoying some 
significant degree of non-domination is a crucial condition of human flourishing, which 
he later stipulates as “success in achieving autonomously formulated, reasonable life 
plans, through fellowship or community with others, over a complete life.”28 Without 
non-domination and subsequent liberation, beings cannot succeed in living well and 
engaging in true community. 
Objections to this idea of liberty as “always a good thing” do exist and are worth 
noting. Most often citing “benevolent care-giving relationships,”29 this objection 
                                                          
26 Frank Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2010): 130. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 131. 
29 Lovett, Frank,  "Republicanism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
Spring 2017 Edition, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/republicanism/. 
 35 
 
essentially follows the logic that if all relationships of domination (that involve humans) 
must be dismantled then, for example, the parent-child relationship is compromised, for it 
embodies and relies upon arbitrary power and domination. This of course becomes 
problematic for it seems to suggest that a child would be better off without a figure caring 
for him/her/them because by doing so that figure would be expressing dominance. This 
suggestion is certainly undesirable due to the inability of young children to flourish 
without the support of guardians, and thus increasing republican freedom in this scenario 
would actually not be ideal. However, responses to this objection focus on the fault of 
considering “an overall evaluation of a whole with an evaluation of its parts considered 
separately;”30 while parent-child relationships are “extremely valuable considered as a 
whole; it does not follow…that this relationship is necessarily valuable in each and every 
part.”31 While this objection seems to fail conceptually, it is worth noting for the fact 
that it reveals “that republican freedom is simply one good among others, with 
which it may come into conflict,”32 a point that is relevant in that it acknowledges 
republican liberty as one among a list of elements that allow for living well yet also 
initiates a consideration of the priority and far-reaching good that this notion can 
contribute to this list. 
CHAPTER 4.3: PHILIP PETTIT AND ARBITRARY POWER 
With a clearer establishment of where the wrong of domination rests in regards to 
liberty I can now venture further into discussing a specific construal of Republican liberty 
and utilizing renowned Political Philosopher Philip Pettit’s work “The Domination 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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Complaint.” While in this work, Pettit focuses his argument on the non-domination of the 
state over the individual, the formulation of his arguments remains applicable and indeed 
useful for considering non-domination from an Ecofeminist perspective for its adherence 
to ideas of respect and implications of validation to the dominated. As previously 
mentioned, Pettit focuses his theories of domination on the concept of “arbitrary” power 
or interference, which can be understood as an interference “that is not controlled by the 
avowable interests of the victim but, as arbitrary interference usually will be, is controlled 
by the arbitrium of the interferer, where arbitrium may refer to will or judgment.”33 He 
further elucidates this idea in his work Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government by noting “Power is arbitrary…when it fails to track the “welfare and world-
view” of those affected;”34 thus, in order for non-arbitrary power or interference actions 
of the state must account for the interests of those on whom they are employed, rather 
than the interests of those exercising the power. 
Pettit continues his assessment of domination with claims of its risk to the ability 
of the dominated to interact discursively with others, for “the fact of being exposed to the 
possibility of arbitrary interference from another impacts in a serious way the likelihood 
that a person will speak his mind.”35 This idea is problematic both for the individual’s 
agency as well as the implication of the perpetuation of domination. That is, not only is 
the dominated less inclined to speak their mind due to concern for further arbitrary 
interference, but in fact any words said by a person who is in a position of subordination 
will be taken less seriously as Pettit queries “how can people trust the remarks of the 
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vulnerable person, especially when they are tailored to fit with the opinions of someone 
in relation to whom they suffer vulnerability.”36 In this way, domination “almost 
invariably undermines a person’s capacity to enjoy respect,”37 for their discursive 
abilities are undermined by their own recognition of the domination as well as for the 
wider common awareness of this domination. Pettit completes his assessment of the role 
of respect in non-domination by concluding that “any society where people’s non-
domination is at a maximum will be a society in which people enjoy a corresponding 
equality of status, with each doing as well as can be expected in commanding the respect 
of their fellows.”38 Respect is invariably an element of liberty and non-domination, as it 
is itself predicated upon non-arbitrary interference, for true respect for the other cannot 
exist if one maintains notions of superiority over the other, and similarly consequently 
undermines equality. Obviously, Pettit’s presentation of the risks of arbitrary power 
speaks loudly to the victim in such scenarios, furthering the importance of 
acknowledging key distinctions between particular types of beings that are victims. 
However, the notions of respect that are brought up do indeed still remain relevant to the 
connected identity throughout systems of domination: the dominator. Pettit’s work will 
later prove useful for emphasizing my argument about the harm that befalls the 
dominator when denying the dominated respect, for not only is equality undermined for 
both parties, but liberty itself is undermined, as well as the harm to healthy and genuine 
relationships and community with the other. The construction of domination that Pettit 
presents is invaluable to the Ecofeminist objective, however it becomes even more 
relevant and helpful when it is paired with Aldo Leopold’s Environmental Ethics 
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theories. Thus, it is productive to introduce Leopold before beginning to apply Pettit 
specifically to Ecofeminism.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 LEOPOLD’S LAND ETHIC 
This Chapter provides an introduction to and foundation of Aldo Leopold that will play 
into each of the main components of my argument. 
CHAPTER 5.1: INTRODUCTION TO LEOPOLD’S OBJECTIVE 
Aldo Leopold is often considered the father of wildlife ecology as well as an 
influential figure in the development of modern environmental ethics.39 Much of his fame 
comes from his work A Sand County Almanac, a collection of essays about his 
perceptions of the natural world written over a twelve-year period and finally published 
in 1949. The first line of the introduction embodies the work’s potential as well as 
function: ““There are some who can live without wild things, and some who cannot. 
These essays are the delights and dilemmas of one who cannot.”40 The work is full of 
sentimental yet informative stories of the wild, fostering compassion within the reader for 
the workings of the natural world. It is a successful expression and sharing of love, for 
Leopold even explicitly notes his objective as such in his introduction: ““When we see 
land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect. 
There is no other way for land to survive the impact of mechanized man, nor for us to 
reap from it the esthetic harvest it is capable, under science, of contributing to culture.”41 
There is a inevitably a distinction made here, between “love” and “respect,” which only 
furthers the magnitude of change and reformulation that Leopold seeks. That is, there 
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must both be a fostering of care for the natural world in combination with a respectful 
positioning next to it; in Leopold’s description it seems almost that these concepts 
necessitate one another to be most effective. This objective is carried throughout the 
work, as each essay carries its own value and evidence. However, while the essays are 
sentimental and compelling in themselves, from a philosophical perspective the most 
value in the work comes in a much late chapter, entitled “The Land Ethic,” which he 
describes as “set[ting] forth, in more logical terms, some of the ideas whereby we 
dissenters rationalize our dissent.”42 He then goes on to say “Only the very sympathetic 
reader will wish to wrestle with the philosophical questions of Part III. I suppose it may 
be said that these essays tell the company how it may get back in step.”43 It is this final 
section of the work that I will focus on for its positioning in the field of ethics, and for the 
instructive role it takes. 
CHAPTER 5.2: LEOPOLD’S RELEVANT ARGUMENT’S 
Aldo Leopold presents a compelling argument for acknowledging and developing 
an environmental ethic, in his chapter “The Land Ethic.” This piece has points that are 
particularly relevant to challenging the dominant frameworks that are illuminated as 
problematic in Warren’s conception of Ecofeminism and the logic of domination. The 
elements of his argument that I want to focus on are extending the conception of 
community as solely human-oriented to a conception that includes land and the natural 
world as well as humanity, re-defining the present understanding of the value of land, 
which as of now stands primarily as economic, and ridding the human-land relationship 
of violence. These three points made by Leopold are compatible with my claim of the 
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concern for the harm inherent within the formulation of a relationship of domination 
itself as it negatively affects leading a good life as well as the nature of relating to the 
other, and contribute to the interpretation of this concern. 
CHAPTER 5.3: EXTENDING COMMUNITY TO LAND 
Leopold begins his account of a land ethic by speaking to the mechanics of an 
ethic; in philosophy this term implies “a differentiation of social from anti-social 
conduct,” and in ecology this term implies “a limitation on freedom action in the struggle 
for existence.”44 His account of these ethics concludes with a summary and conflation of 
the basis of each: “the thing [ethic] has its origin in the tendency of interdependent 
individuals or groups to evolve modes of cooperation.”45 That is, an ethic is analogous to 
“a kind of community instinct,”46 prompting the individual to cooperate in order to 
survive in a space reliant upon interdependence. It is from this point that Leopold can 
then make the first claim: insofar as ethics rest upon the premise of community and 
interdependence, developing an ethic for land is to simply enlarge “the boundaries of the 
community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.”47 If 
this extension is upheld, then the community instinct should compel a more respectful 
and cooperative treatment of the land for it “changes the role of Homo sapiens from 
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it;”48 as such, the 
relationship of human to nature becomes one that is not founded on domination. In 
regards to Ecofeminism, the extension of community becomes crucial as true cooperation 
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within a community requires equality, and as long as women live unequally in a 
patriarchy, their “cooperation” in the community is null as it is based on a foundation of 
oppression. Similarly, if the publicly accepted perspective on nature is as separate from 
the social community, then there cannot be a cooperative and equal relationship and thus 
instead permits the framework of domination that exists today. 
CHAPTER 5.4: RE-PRESCRIBING VALUE TO LAND 
The next important element that Leopold calls attention to is the conception of 
value in the land. This element presupposes the initial argument for extending community 
to land, for it explains the “why” behind that notion. In fact, re-prescribing the value in 
land is important for any attempts at environmental ethics, as noted in many theories 
including Deep Ecology. Leopold addresses this issue by delineating land as being more 
than “merely soil.”49 Rather, it is “a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, 
plants, and animals,”50 one such flow of energy upon which all of life, including human 
life, depends. In this way, the value is not solely economically driven, but rather is 
framed as a necessary life force for all beings as well as is a living energy in its own 
right. This framing of the natural world is particularly salient in the socio-political 
climate today in regards to climate change. The human reliance upon and assurance in the 
land is jeopardized insofar as humanity continues to poison and dominate that flow of 
energy. However, it is important to note that Leopold’s formulation of value is not simply 
instrumental, despite his recognition of the human dependency upon the land. Rather, he 
structures his argument based on the assumption that “we can be ethical only in relation 
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to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in.”51 With this 
understanding of ethical relationships, defining the natural world as a fountain of energy 
upon which humanity depends as well as within which humanity exists, formulates the 
land as something humanity can indeed “see, feel, understand, love…[and] have faith 
in,”52 for in many ways it is described as a being itself. This seems to suggest the value as 
intrinsic in that the good of the land can be felt and understood, and thus it is “prima facie 
worthy of being preserved or promoted as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity 
whose good it is.”53 The natural world is not an entity that should be treated as a “mere 
object” nor valuable only for its instrumentality, but rather must be recognized as having 
a well-being that “is judged to have value in and of itself.”54 Leopold’s interpretation of 
value seems convincing for its painting of the natural world as a system within which 
humanity exists, holding intrinsic value as a central point but also recognizing and 
utilizing the instrumental value of the land to further arguments for an environmental 
ethic. An argument for Ecofeminism is incomplete unless it holds a reason for a worthy 
value in land, worthy enough to be considered equal and “twin” to the value of women in 
society. What Leopold begins to offer in his argument for reframing the value of the 
environment is a justification for having an environmental ethic, and further, a 
justification for the impermissibility of the domination of nature that is equal and twin to 
the impermissibility of the domination of women, despite their values being different. 
Insofar as he offers an account of the intrinsic value of nature, regardless of how that 
value may be weighted differently from the value of women, domination of the natural 
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world cannot also exist as it undermines the recognition of this intrinsic value by evading 
genuine respect and love.  
CHAPTER 5.5: VIOLENCE IN THE HUMAN-LAND RELATIONSHIP 
In regards to confronting the violence of man on nature, the argument becomes 
more vague and may also require filling out, yet nonetheless remains important. Leopold 
acknowledges the deficit of information in this element of his argument, but in regards to 
the core of it explains that “man-made changes are of a different order than evolutionary 
changes, and have effects more comprehensive than is intended or foreseen.”55 Thus, we 
must take great caution in all environmental alterations, anticipating the extension of our 
actions on the environment, for “the less violent the man made changes, the greater the 
probability of successful readjustment in the pyramid.”56 While this aspect of Leopold’s 
argument is small, I highlight it along with the others because of the domination inherent 
in the use of the word “violence” as well as the urgency implied from it. If we can extend 
our community to include the land, so too can we extend our language and conceptual 
framework to include domination of nature under the umbrella of violence, under which 
the domination of women already explicitly exists. However, it is also important to take 
care not to conflate this element with a focus on harm, for instead it should be a helpful 
way of considering the process of domination without moving into the muddled 
complications of harm. This point of violence will become even more relevant when I 
approach the latter part of my argument, that of re-constructing a relationship between the 
dominator and the dominated. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DECONSTRUCTING THE HUMAN-LAND RELATIONSHIP AND APPLYING 
LEOPOLD AND WARREN 
In this Chapter I can begin to tie my argument together by applying the layers of 
foundation I have set up in previous sections. I will focus specifically on the first part of 
my argument, applying what has been set up to the concern of “Living Well.” 
CHAPTER 6.1: INTRODUCING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LEOPOLD AND 
DOMINATION  
“The Land Ethic” is a work rich with many salient points, however I have focused on the 
above three for what each can say about Ecofeminism and in turn what Ecofeminism can 
about each. Extending our concept of community to maintain an ethic for land, re-
evaluating what makes land valuable, and recognizing and then clearing the violence 
from the human-land relationship are incredibly important points in both connecting the 
twin dominations of women and nature as well as addressing them. Further, these points 
are relevant to considering the negative implications within a relationship of domination, 
and lend themselves to considering more explicitly the relationship between humanity 
and the environment and deconstructing it with a focus on this problematic relationship 
of domination. 
CHAPTER 6.2: CHARACTERIZING THE “WESTERN” RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
LAND AS DOMINATION 
It is difficult to consider broadly the contemporary human relationship with the 
environment, as it is by no means singular, affected instead by societal, cultural, and 
personal contexts. However, for the purpose of working within a somewhat succinct 
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interpretation of the human-nature relationship, I will focus mainly on a generalized 
Western context and the general benefits that people in the West garner from the natural 
world (regardless of the personal connections with and/or activism for the environment to 
which certain Western communities may better relate due to their ultimate minority 
position). As I have already touched on, there are the utility and necessity frameworks to 
consider in the oppression of the natural world. The implications that extend from these 
frameworks are simple: humanity ravages the natural world for the needs of the human 
species. The relationship between a general Western context and the natural world is 
defined by what the natural world can give to the human. While indeed, there are 
populations, or at least individuals, who more actively consider their role in 
environmental degradation, even these individuals benefit from the systematic ravaging 
of the natural world in some way or another. The construction of highways and roads 
often requires explosive manipulation of the natural world that gets in the way, and yet 
these highways and roads are instrumental to a functioning Western society. As Rachel 
Carson first brought to light, the agriculture industry has historically consistently ravaged 
the environment with toxins and pollutants, and this reality is still relevant today, albeit in 
different ways. The average American produces about 4.4 pounds of waste per day, waste 
that does not simply disappear but rather works its own harms upon the functioning and 
purity of the natural world.57 It is not difficult to continue to list ways in which the human 
relationship to the natural world is consistently harmful and oppressive.  
It seems acceptable to claim that there is virtually no community feeling 
extending from the general Western human life to the natural world, and similarly, that 
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there is not a widespread recognition of the value of the natural world beyond this 
ultimately detrimental instrumental value. It also seems acceptable to posit that the way 
the environment is treated is violent; the extreme use of explosives, clear cutting of 
forests, and slaughtering of farmed animals as well as wildlife should be imagery enough 
to convey this violence. If one accepts that the general Western relationship to the 
environment is quite negative and indeed harmful to the natural world for its 
undiscerning focus on utility, the task then becomes deconstructing this relationship 
through the lens of domination and considering the way that oppression is being 
constructed and perpetuated.   
         The domination involved in the above examples is striking. The human 
relationship to the environment is incontestably related to domination, if not simply just 
domination based. Again, the Western human psyche seems to consider the environment 
through a lens of utility, a lens from which the following logic emerges: If subject 1 is 
defined by and related to for its utility by subject 2, and there is no notion of equal 
reciprocity from subject 2 to subject 1 but rather there is a general theme of violent 
exploitation that subject 2 employs on subject 1, then subject 2 dominates subject 1. 
Insofar as the natural world is perceived primarily by the Western world for its utility, a 
utility employed by violent exploitation, and there is no evidence of the western world 
giving to the same extent that it is taking from the natural world, then the western world 
is dominating the natural world. The way in which that domination is negative depends 
on how it affects both the subject as well as the agent involved in the process. 
         The problem inherent in this relationship is twofold. For the dominator, 
domination presents both a risk of obstruction to living well as well as to the process of 
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relating to the Other. To the first point, there must be a framework within which to work 
to consider how a particular kind of thing could obstruct the dominators process of living 
well (in this case, that kind of thing would be domination itself), and in doing so, 
ultimately harm a beings perfectionist value. As outlined in Chapter 4, “Living Well,” the 
framework within which I work is that of a Republican idea of freedom and non-
domination and specifically Philip Pettit’s conception of this theory. 
CHAPTER 6.3: APPLYING PETTIT TO THE DOMINATION OF LAND AND ADDRESSING 
THE EFFECTS ON THE DOMINATOR 
These arguments are quite applicable to the domination of women and, perhaps 
with a little more thought, can be applied as commentary on the domination of the natural 
world. To the former, a man is in the position of interfering arbitrarily in a woman’s 
affairs simply as a function of the systematic oppression and the privilege inherent in 
being a superior within this system, (even as this privilege may be unrecognized by him). 
Such examples of arbitrary interference that a male may (and many males do) exercise 
daily range from participating in the perpetuation of the glass ceiling and inhibiting the 
mobility of women to the concept of “taking up space” and consequently leaving no room 
for the quietly oppressed woman. In regards to the natural world, it is both quite 
reasonable and simultaneously difficult to apply concerns of arbitrary power. Humans are 
in the position of interfering arbitrarily in the natural world’s affairs to the extent that we 
are not “forced to track the avowable interests” of the natural world, and instead base our 
consumption of it solely on our own interests. However, this idea is also convoluted when 
applied to the natural world because it does in theory require the natural world the 
capacity to “avow interests” explicitly, a capacity that is nonexistent. Nonetheless, it is 
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not difficult to assume at least basic interests of the natural world and recognize the 
humans utter dismissal of those, or at least recognize that as it stands now, humans act 
only on their own will or judgment, a judgment that is skewed towards violent 
domination. 
As Pettit’s notions of domination as inhibiting participation in discursive spaces 
and thus respect are applied to the oppression of women, it is not difficult to see both the 
suppressed voice of women as well as the neglect of basic respect for women in a variety 
of contexts, again citing examples such as the glass ceiling or even practices of cat calling 
and sexual harassment. Of course, again when the natural world is considered this 
becomes more difficult to apply, for the natural world cannot interact in discursive spaces 
regardless; nonetheless, as one begins to consider reassessing the value of the natural 
world the notion of a basic respect is inevitable. Again, the relevance of the distinct 
features of women versus nature has been made clear; however, it is still possible to 
utilize these points of Pettit’s to address harm to the dominator, which connects both. 
Regarding value, insofar as the dominator is not giving respect then their capacity to 
enjoy the act of giving respect and recognizing the value of other is inhibited, and thus 
their process of relation to the other is compromised, an idea that I will return to and 
address later. Pettit’s last point of equality as tied up with respect is invaluable to the 
Ecofeminist objective, for while it is controversial to assert the natural world as deserving 
a status of equality, there is at least a call to recognize the oppression that does indeed 
rest on a violent inequality. With domination, there can be no equality, and that very lack 
of equality, while benefiting the dominator in a prudential sense due to privilege, 
inevitably is harmful in the sense of perfectionist value. 
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While throughout Pettit’s arguments there are echoes of Leopold’s logic, such as 
the assumption and necessity of reevaluating value, there is no connection more clear 
between the two thinkers than that of the community logic. That is, valuing non-
domination is inherently tied to valuing community for without one the other is not 
possible. As Leopold is himself focused on environmental ethics, and as the human to 
human connection and necessity for community is relatively easier to conceptualize, I 
will focus in this section on how the community value of non-domination relates to the 
natural world. Non-domination cannot exist in a solitary setting, for “to enjoy non-
domination it is necessary, first, to have other people around with whom one interacts; 
and second, that one not be dominated by those people…One must enjoy the absence of 
domination in a context where it is a real possibility, not enjoy it as a mere byproduct of 
total isolation.”58 As Leopold posits, entering into a community with the land is necessary 
for developing an ethic for it, and in that same vein, entering into a community with the 
land should itself mean all enjoying non-domination alongside equal others.  
The second connection between non-domination and community appears with the 
recognition that “a person’s immunity to arbitrary interference—a person’s non-
domination—will not materialize as a causal result of the institutional measures taken to 
realize it; rather, it will be constituted by those measures, being present just as soon as 
they are present.”59 That is, non-domination must preface social structures as a 
foundational identity rather than a causal identity, for one cannot be immune to non-
domination unless the measures protecting against arbitrary interference exist as one does 
rather than consequentially. Otherwise, there is left the risk of a potential period of time 
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for enactment during which the measures could take effect and thus leave space for the 
domination itself to exist. Thus, the community must institute measures that make the 
dominated secure against the arbitrary interference by other members of the community. 
In regards to the natural world, the specific measures that may be taken to protect its non-
domination are themselves not difficult to imagine, such as legal initiatives and 
protections, however the tactic of implementation itself requires a reordering of priority 
for the human species and a commitment to respecting the community so that the 
measures are valued as a primary necessity rather than as consequentially important.  
Pettit’s final formulation of the connection between community and non-
domination relies on the fact that enjoying non-domination requires that non-domination 
exist for all others in the same vulnerability class, “you cannot enjoy freedom as non-
domination without others in every salient class to which you belong—including... others 
in the society as a whole—enjoying that sort of freedom as well.”60 Considering this 
element of non-domination and community through an Ecofeminist lens requires noting 
again that women and the natural world are not the same type of “thing,” and thus are not 
exactly in the same vulnerability class. Nonetheless, due to their twin structural 
oppressions this community standard of non-domination seems to apply in a similar way 
that it would if they were in a single vulnerability class. This argument becomes 
complicated in that it seems to posit that any domination of any “thing” inhibits the 
enjoyment of non-domination for every “thing,” and thus the claim becomes incredibly 
large and vulnerable to counters of a “slippery slope.” That is, a society and world 
without domination of any sort seems unfeasible, as there are systems within the world 
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that require some extent of domination, such as the concept of owning and utilizing any 
material item. While it is true that material items are neither rational nor sentient, and, as 
has been established, nor is the natural world, there must be a distinction between the two 
in order for the domination of material items to not be classified as domination in the 
same way. Whether one approaches this distinction by considering the notion of human-
created items versus that beyond the creation and in this way control of human, or 
through another approach, I will leave this argument unresolved due to its tangential 
relation to the ultimate case I hope to make, for regardless of the outcome of this 
question, the point of non-domination as enjoyable only if it exists for all is worth 
consideration. Without equal non-domination, there can be no genuine liberty. 
The way that domination affects the process of participating in genuine 
relationships, in this case with the environment, is more of an abstract and emotively 
structured harm than a logically structured and supported harm (as is the impact on 
liberty), however it is a harm nonetheless. While the terms “domination” and “power” are 
often used in the context of social relationships, in Leopold’s formulation of extending 
the social community to include the natural world these terms can reasonably apply in 
relationships with the natural world. Insofar as humanity is in a relationship with the 
natural world and in that relationship has a power over the natural world that is exercised 
in an unjust manner, then arbitrary domination is employed. The question then becomes, 
what exactly does this do to the process of relating to that that is arbitrarily, or violently, 
dominated? In the second part of my argument, I will move from the notion of liberty to 
the notion of relating to the Other, and consider the implications of dominating on 
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relating. I will explore this notion further, as well as the ensuing implications of such, in 
the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PROCESS OF RELATING TO THE OTHER AND ISOLATION 
This chapter supplies the second part of my argument regarding the impacts of 
domination on the process of relating to the Other, and in doing so completes my 
argument. 
CHAPTER 7.1: LEOPOLD’S REPRESENTATION OF THE HUMAN-LAND 
RELATIONSHIP 
Relating to the natural world is a task within itself, a task on which Leopold 
spends over twenty chapters attempting to instigate in A Sand County Almanac. However, 
the nature and very process of relating to another is affected deeply when that other is 
conceived as a kind of thing to be dominated. In fact, it is impossible to relate genuinely 
to a subject when that subject is one such that is dominated in every mode of one’s own 
life, for the subject becomes unknowable. That is, one may relate to an oppressed subject 
insofar as that relationship is comprised of dominator-dominated or superior-inferior, but 
this positioning acts to inherently suppress the ability of a genuine and fully-formed 
relationship to develop as it silences knowledge of the dominated that could exist outside 
the scope of the category of “inferior.” To know a subject, beyond the subject’s 
externalized being, and beyond the utility that humanity conceives of as definitive in the 
natural world, requires a view free from oppressive tendencies and subjugating mindsets. 
This view must utilize concepts of knowing such as respect, compassion, or at the very 
least validation. These elements are distinctly missing in the human-nature relationship, 
as it is comprised of violence, flagrant exploitation, and ultimately domination. 
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As has been established, it is the harm to the value of the dominator that must be 
the action-guiding element for redefining the human-land relationship. Nonetheless, this 
action relies upon a sufficiently divergent alternative to a relationship with the land that is 
based in domination, and thus again here I will reference Leopold for his work in 
representing a more positive relationship with the land. As Leopold’s account relies upon 
respect, which in itself relies upon intrinsic value, I will account for the controversy in 
approaching questions of intrinsic value by simply granting that the intrinsic value of 
land is the reason why we can respect the land, while still holding that the reason we 
ought to respect the land is for the harm that becomes our perfectionist value in a 
relationship based in domination. 
While I have already introduced Leopold, it will be helpful here to briefly include 
further explication of points that are uniquely applicable to this part of my argument, that 
is, to my position about relating to the environment. Leopold’s characterization of the 
best human-land relationship is defined by reverence, love and understanding, 
recognition of value, and harmony. Underlying each of these concepts is the premise of a 
renewed, genuine respect; throughout A Sand County Almanac this premise can be 
observed in various places, both within and outside of “The Land Ethic.” To the latter, 
there is a particularly emotive section referenced widely by Environmentalists to this day 
as simply the “Fierce Green Fire,” in which Leopold hunts a wolf only to “watch a fierce 
green fire dying in her eyes,” and to realize that in those eyes “there was something 
known only to her and to the mountain…[he] thought that because fewer wolves meant 
more deer, that no wolves would mean hunters’ paradise. But after seeing the green fire 
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die, [he] sensed that neither the wolf nor the mountain agreed with such a view.”61 In this 
passage there is more than a hunting narrative; there is an actual recorded moment in 
which a reversal of views about the land occurs, from that which is meant to be 
dominated to that which is valuable, which itself ultimately results in a fundamental 
change in the relationship. This narrative is reiterated more overtly and argumentatively 
in his chapter “The Land Ethic” in passages that I have already referenced in earlier 
sections. Leopold speaks to extending the boundaries of the community to include the 
land,62 to changing “the role of Homo Sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to 
plain member and citizen of it…imply[ing] respect for his fellow-members, and also 
respect for the community as such,”63 and to extending the social conscience “from 
people to land.”64 Thus again and again in Leopold appears this call for a respect that 
recognizes value in the land beyond simple utility. 
CHAPTER 7.2: WHY LEOPOLD’S REPRESENTATION CANNOT EXIST 
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH DOMINATION; ISOLATION 
While I have claimed that Leopold has presented an alternative to a relationship 
based in domination in his depiction of a relationship of respect, elaboration on what 
domination itself breeds and how Leopold’s alternative cannot exist with domination, 
(thus avoiding this negativity), may further clarify these points. As has been stated, it 
seems domination is harmful to the human perfectionist value for its tendency to breed 
isolation. This isolation parallels Marxist ideas of alienation as it is rooted in an 
estrangement from an essential reality within us. However, in this case, that estrangement 
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is from our dependence on and shared space with the natural world. Without delving too 
far into arguments about whether human kind is a part of or apart from the natural world, 
I aim to convey that our relationship with the natural world is inextricable from the way 
in which we move through the world. That is, human beings are undeniably engaging 
reciprocally with the natural world every moment, whether they be practicing 
permaculture in a secluded place, or simply breathing in oxygen and releasing carbon 
dioxide. Yet, in many societies today, the natural world functions simply as resource to 
which we have neither ties nor obligations, and thus may exploit. Therein is bred this 
isolation: a detachment from and dismissal of a core part of our being. 
This correlation between “using” and “isolation” is most clear in the following 
example. Suppose Greg is a devout Buddhist, who has been practicing for many years, 
and engages with the tradition in a holistic and respectful way. Now, consider that Dan 
considers himself Buddhist, but focuses more on creating a certain reputation for himself 
by identifying with Buddhism rather than participating in the tradition respectfully and 
reciprocally as Greg does. In this example, it seems uncontroversial to say that Greg’s 
relationship with Buddhism is the preferred and more meaningful one, and further, is 
even healthier for his being. It also seems uncontroversial to claim that insofar as Dan 
engages with Buddhism only to utilize it for his own ends, he remains relatively detached 
and isolated from Buddhism, and even spirituality itself, misusing and misunderstanding 
the distinctly human relationship that is religion and spirituality. While religion 
admittedly has a very different relationship to human life than does the natural world, in 
both cases there is a deeper understanding and more meaningful life at stake, a chance to 
flourish in a holistic sense either more or less. Further, from both religion and the natural 
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world, constitute a human relationship that is core to human life and begs for a rule of 
navigation. If one is to flourish less well, these relationships are based on utility alone 
and thus produce isolation from the other; if one is to flourish holistically, these 
relationships have respect embedded within it.65 
This isolation obstructs any hope of engaging with others and with ourselves in a 
holistic way, for as much as we deny our ability to relate to the natural world, we deny 
each other’s as well, until we are left without a recognition of genuine relationship 
around which our lives revolve. Thus, we deny others and ourselves the ability to flourish 
holistically, without denying a central part of ourselves. Val Plumwood explores this 
notion further in her work Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, basing her claims in the 
dualism that defines domination-based relationships. Plumwood identifies a dualism as 
“an intense, established and developed cultural expression” of an oppressive hierarchical 
relationship, “constructing central cultural concepts and identities so as to make equality 
and mutuality literally unthinkable”66. Within dualism there exist key elements that 
Plumwood focuses on to explore the nature of dualism, one particularly relevant one 
being “Radical exclusion”/hyper separation. Plumwood describes this phenomenon of 
minimizing continuity as “important in eliminating identification and sympathy between 
members of the dominating class and the dominated, and in eliminating possible 
confusion between powerful and powerless.”67 She goes on to argue that “a major aim of 
dualistic construction is polarization, to maximize difference or separation between the 
                                                          
65 Here I do not intend to convey that every human must have a deep connection to religion, but rather that 
there ought to be a respect of it and for it, regardless of personal participation in or affiliation with it.  
66 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Taylor & Francis, 2002): 48. 
67 Ibid., 50.  
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dualised spheres and to prevent their being seen as continuous or contiguous.”68 Thus, 
built into the very structure of domination is the practice of creating distance between 
oneself and the other, reinforcing this domination and isolation between oneself and on 
that which one depends. Plumwood’s characterization of domination aligns with my 
concern about the harmful processes that exist in and are bred by domination, and serve 
to both clarify as well as universalize the harmful effects on the dominator in a 
domination based relationship, and ultimately calling attention to the risk to perfectionist 
value. Insofar as one takes part in the radical exclusion of the natural world from oneself 
and from others, one cannot flourish holistically by relating genuinely to the other, and 
further, cannot participate in genuine community. 
As my references to Plumwood begin to explore, there are a number of elements 
working both together as well as individually within the concept of domination that are at 
work in this particular process of harm. Beyond the dualism, the next and most obvious is 
that of hierarchical structures that premise domination, and the implicit biases that are 
bound within that structure as it functions to oppress. These hierarchical structures inhibit 
developing an understanding of (and thus silence) that which is deemed of lesser value, 
that is, that which is being dominated. This silencing works to not only inhibit the 
external value of the oppressed, but further acts as the aforementioned positive feedback 
loop in that it obstructs genuine, uninhibited understanding of the dominated that would 
itself allow for more than inferiority. With this lack of genuine understanding wedded to 
a system that is structured by power, domination absolutely undermines sincere reverence 
and equal respect and recognition of value; still, it is not clear that it entirely undermines 
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respect. It does seem reasonable to argue that domination allows for a certain kind of 
condescending reverence (albeit misconstrued and perverted in that it is bred from an 
assumption of inferiority) that could allow a kind of respect to develop. Nonetheless, this 
type of respect is not the image of respect that Leopold preaches, nor is it a type of 
respect that would allow for a connection and recognition of value to develop that would 
be free from oppressive ideations. Insofar as this assessment of domination notes the 
complexities of respect tied to non-domination, it seems that Leopold’s characterization 
of the ideal human-land relationship requires a dismissal of systems of domination. 
CHAPTER 7.3: CAN WE ENTER INTO COMMUNITY WITH THE LAND? 
There is another element to Leopold’s claims that need be considered more 
critically: that of the possibility of entering into a community of land. Even as I have 
granted the intrinsic value of land as only the reason why we can respect the land, (again, 
not the reason we should), it does not seem that the same allowance necessarily assumes 
the conclusion that it is also possible to enter into a community with the land. In fact, 
respecting the natural world seems, in some respects, quite different from entering into a 
community with it. In exploring this question further, it is helpful to turn to Edith Stein’s 
formulation of the concept of community. The aspect of Stein’s philosophy of 
community that I will focus on is her delineation of the two necessary components for a 
community: “that its functions and organizations are conformable and that there are 
individuals who can fulfill its functions.”69 It seems here that there is room to argue for 
the environments involvement in such a context. To the former, the conformability, if the 
community’s primary function is to instill respect of all members, or that is, not do the 
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opposite of this by propagating domination, then the function is conformable for even the 
non-rational beings as the natural world cannot dominate humans other than through 
hunting processes. As actively hunting humans is not a natural instinct for any organism 
besides polar bears, and further, as I have not meant to disbar hunting by categorizing it 
as domination in totality but only as domination insofar as it is done in the careless and 
exploitative way that humans have recently done, this point becomes moot. Additionally, 
the second component of Stein’s philosophy of community may even do away with the 
need for the natural world to fulfill the first component, as it simply states that there be 
individuals who can fulfill its functions, and does not ask that all individuals within the 
community be able to fulfill its functions. That is, it is clear that the human side of the 
community is able to instill respect in all members and carry out necessary secondary 
functions of the community, which in itself accounts for Stein’s concept of community 
without even calling upon the natural world. Thus, a community that consists of humans 
and the natural world satisfies Stein’s necessary components of a community, making 
possible Leopold’s community recommendations. 
There is one element of Stein’s conception of community that raises concerns 
when applied to the human-land relationship. Stein claims that “genuine community aims 
at union, a community of life and a community of being that is rooted in the personal and 
touches the core of the personality of the subjects. It is characterized by genuine feelings 
arising from the personal “I” of each.”70 This depiction of community, especially the last 
line addressing the personal “I,” seems incompatible with claims that posit community 
between humans and the natural world. As I have held throughout my arguments, the 
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complexity and controversiality, and admittedly unlikelihood of the rational and 
introspective capacity of the natural world is not worth arguing for; therefore, it seems 
immediately that the ability of the natural world to participate in community is denied. 
However, as I have highlighted previously, in Stein’s account of community she does 
reflect on the non-necessity for all members of a community to be equally accountable 
and participatory members of the community. Rather, “the quality of the community’s 
life depends upon the life-giving motives of individuals and the vitality with which they 
carry these motives into action for the life of the community;”71 that is, while community 
aims at total participation and union that calls on the personal, it seems that this totality 
only functions to determine the quality of the community, rather than the existence of the 
community. Of course, this not a perfect response to Stein as following that point I am 
now forced to concede that while community may exist between humans and the natural 
world the quality is unavoidably compromised by the non-participation of the natural 
world due to the inability for introspection. However, my response does at least still 
allow for some type of community to exist between humans and the natural world, and 
thus Leopold’s ethics can persist. 
With the above structure and concessions to my position, my argument thus is 
confirmed and created by Stein, Leopold, and Warren, for with their theories it becomes 
clear that not only is it possible to be in community with the natural world, but in fact it is 
necessary to do so in order to preserve the dominators perfectionist value of a communal, 
gregarious, and non-isolated way of relating, that is, of living in and with the world. 
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CONCLUSION 
Karen Warren’s arguments about Ecofeminism that focus on the twin dominations 
of women and the natural world, and the commitment that one has to dismantling both if 
one is to dismantle either, contribute important work to Ecofeminist theory. Warren 
presents arguments that connect the oppression of women with the natural world clearly 
and concisely, and begins to address questions about dismantling structural frameworks 
that dominate the marginalized in parallel and connected ways. 
Nonetheless, there is room for significant alterations and additions to Warren’s 
argument, which I have tried to provide here with aid from Aldo Leopold’s philosophical 
thought. While Warren works from the position that the wronging done to women and the 
natural world in the process of their oppression can be the action-guiding element for 
dismantling the dominations, I have presented an alternative which attempts to recognize 
the different particularities of the natural world and of women that do make each of their 
dominations distinct in some ways. This alternative recognizes this distinction and avoids 
problematic arguments that overlook it by appealing to the moral problems inherent in 
the process of dominating itself. I argue that the commitment to dismantling the twin 
dominations of the natural world and of women comes not from the wrong done to each 
victim, but rather from the negative effects that dominating has on living well as well as 
on the process of relating to the other, that is, the harm that befalls the perfectionist value 
of the dominator in these ways. This argument is set up quite well by Philip Pettit’s 
description of what human flourishing, or perfectionist value, requires “success in 
achieving autonomously formulated, reasonable life plans, through fellowship or 
community with others, over a complete life.” There is the element of liberty, as well as 
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that of community and relationships; both of which, as I have argued, are necessary 
components of a human beings perfectionist value.  
Domination directly inhibits the process of living well by obstructing a crucial 
element of living well, that of liberty. Using the Republican theory of Liberty (with 
reference to Philosophers Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit), which requires the absence of 
domination, in combination with theories that recognize the inability for equality so long 
as domination exists, as well as the inherently social value that is non-domination, I have 
posited that to be a human being that dominates is incompatible with being a human 
being that lives well and flourishes. The second piece of my argument that reinforces the 
way that domination affects the dominator focuses on the way dominating negatively 
affects the process of relating to the other and breeds isolation, both elements that 
themselves inflict harm on the perfectionist value of the dominator. I argue this point by 
acknowledging the relationship between community and respect, and identifying thinkers 
such as Val Plumwood and again, Leopold, who outline how to be in community with 
another, juxtaposed against my interpretation of the isolation that is bred by dominating 
the other. That is, to dominate is to directly inhibit genuine relationships with the other, 
and inherently isolate oneself, a function that is incompatible with human flourishing. 
 By identifying two important harms that domination inflicts on the perfectionist 
value of the dominator, I hope I have presented an alternative cause (or at least the initial 
components of a cause) to dismantle the domination of women and the natural world, one 
that does not get into potentially difficult and controversial claims of harm to the victims 
in each domination, but rather hopefully inspires the dominator to act by acknowledging 
what is at stake when dominating. The implications of this argument could be massive, 
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not only for woman and the natural world, but for all minorities and subordinates placed 
into the “other” category that Warren references. To challenge the logic of domination by 
clarifying the harms that it presents to the dominator is to reframe a structure that justifies 
subordination that happens everyday and everywhere in our world today, and to do so in 
such a way that provokes the self-preservation instinct within the human character. Of 
course, there are questions still left by this argument, both of the social and logistical 
nature. To the former, I have not dealt specifically with the reality and implication of 
being in both categories, that is, both dominator and dominated (for example, a white 
woman), and the impacts to the navigation of such. As oppression is a layered process 
within individuals, my arguments thus far need additional work that addresses the way 
these perfectionist harms play out in the layered identities that define most individuals. 
Another important social point to note is that of undermining the harm that is done to the 
dominated. Even as it varies based on the distinct natures of those being harmed, the 
harm that oppression brings is exorbitant and extravagant, and is important to recognize 
even as I have argued it a difficult position to base intersectional commitments from. 
What I have presented here leaves open questions of recognizing this harm to the subject, 
and in that same vein, as I have noted throughout it does not address the complexities of 
arguments for or against the intrinsic value of the natural world. To the logistical gaps in 
my argument, there is significant room and need to consider what exactly a society 
without domination would look like. That is, to make claims to dismantle value-
hierarchies is a strong position to take, and requires much more content and discussion 
regarding what would be left. A final point worth noting that I have left relatively 
unaddressed as well as have noted previously in the paper, is the concern of whether there 
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does indeed exist inherent value in the natural world. While I have attempted to make 
clear that my argument does not rest on the validity of the claim that the natural world 
has inherent value, and thus have not explored that argument extensively, my argument is 
nonetheless impacted by the validity of this claim and thus could be supplemented by 
further argumentation and content.  
 It goes without saying that making claims about dismantling entire frameworks 
through which social life is filtered is a difficult task. What I have presented here is just 
an initial step, or rather, a re-route into approaching an Ecofeminist objective by 
changing the point of focus and inspiration for action. There are enormous implications 
and important questions that follow from this initial re-route of focus that I have tried to 
initiate with these arguments, regarding the dominator, the dominated, and the 
intersection of both. Nonetheless, my hope is that this project begins to make important 
distinctions between the nature of the subjects of domination, while still giving reasons to 
dismantle all dominations, namely through the perfectionist value of the dominator.  
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